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1INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
1. Truck safety has become a high agenda topic in Australia, especially following the
crashes in NSW between trucks and coaches which led to the loss of many lives in 1988
and 1989. The crashes received much media attention, resulting in a negative image of the
trucking industry. Immediate action taken by politicians to reduce speed limits and the call
for an inquiry into the crashes highlighted the dearth of scientific evidence on the underlying
causes of the on-road behaviour of long distance heavy vehicle drivers, and thus levels of
exposure to risk of a crash. There has been little detailed inquiry into the real causes of
heavy vehicle crashes; explanations tend to concentrate on localised reasons or rely on
anecdotal evidence.
2. This paper examines the hypothesis, first proposed by Hensher and Battellino (1990),
that the underlying causes of unsafe on-road behaviour (and hence increased exposure to
risk) are inherently linked to the structure of economic reward in the long distance road
transport industry. Drawing on a larger study (Hensher et al. 1991), we investigate the
relationship between economic reward and on-road behaviour, particularly unsafe work
practices. On-road performance is defined in terms of speeding, and fatigue caused by long
working and driving hours, demanding work routines and night time driving, which are
sustained by the use of stimulants. A number of studies have shown that speed and fatigue
are major factors in heavy vehicle crashes (Sweatman et al. 1990; Staysafe 1989). Aspects
of economic reward influencing behaviour include low freight rates, high expenses for
owner drivers, uncertainty of annual income, contracts, method of payment and competition
in the industry.
3. Although the incidence of crashes relative to exposure on the road is very small and
represents an impressive safety record, there is still reason for concern. The issues of safety
and the degree of exposure to risk have implications for efficiency in the industry. The
operating environment of the industry contributes to unsafe behaviour, but the industry
does not meet the full cost of such behaviour, due to externalities.
4. The interactions between the major elements of the study are summarised
schematically in Figure 1. The critical dimensions which require explanation are the
economic rewards (annual income net of expenses), the hours of work required to earn an
acceptable income, the number of productive driving hours, the incidence of speeding, the
extent of fines and links with economic return, the incidence of pill taking, and self
imposition of schedules and its linkage with on-road performance, particularly sources of
exposure to risk.
THE APPROACH
Method
5. Data to test the hypothesis was obtained directly from 800 long distance truck drivers
throughout Australia who were surveyed in an in-depth face to face interview. Drivers were
surveyed at general loading and unloading depots in the larger capital cities and at truck
stops in smaller cities to ensure higher response rates and to include a wide range of drivers.
Large company drivers were also covered by interviewing at large company loading depots.
26. A comprehensive questionnaire was used to gather profile information from the driver
including the operation of the trucking business as well as demographic data, and to obtain
details on a recent trip. The key questions collected details of the driver's most recent trip
including origin and destination, cargo, freight rate, scheduling constraints, loading and
unloading arrangements and activities in the 8 hours before departure, as well as the time,
place, purpose and duration of each stop on the trip.
Figure 1 Major elements of the study
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4of structural equations was necessary to represent the two-way causality inherent in the
sources of influence on the driver's behaviour on the road.
8. In the analysis, safety and exposure to risk were represented by variations in average
trip speed across the population of truck drivers. A positive logarithmic relationship
between exposure to risk and speeding was assumed, enabling a number of definitions to be
used as suitable proxies for exposure to risk.
Drivers
9. A wide range of driver types were represented in the sample, as indicated in Table I.
There is no reference data to determine how representative the sample is of the total
population of truck drivers.
TABLE I
TYPE OF DRIVERS IN SAMPLE
DRIVER TYPE % OF SAMPLE
Owner drivers 38%
Fleet owners 3%
Prime contractors 3%
Independent subcontractors 14%
Independent owner drivers 17%
Employee drivers 62%
Small company drivers (1-5 trucks) 25%
Medium company drivers (6-29 trucks) 23%
Large company drivers (30 or more trucks) 15%
Total (820 drivers) 100% 100%
ON-ROAD PERFORMANCE
10. The performance of drivers on the road was evaluated in terms of a number of
measures. A wide spectrum of performance was found, with only a small proportion of
drivers engaging in what would be considered unsafe behaviour. We are interested in the
aspects of the driver's working environment and activities that may induce and/or encourage
fatigue and speeding, two factors implicated in higher exposure to risk.
FATIGUE
11. Fatigue is recognised as a significant contributing factor in crashes, although
estimates of the proportion of crashes caused by fatigue vary. For example, a study
investigating heavy vehicle crashes in NSW in 1988-89 found that up to 60% involved
some element of driver fatigue (Sweatman et al. 1990). Other estimates range from
attributing 20-30% of highway fatalities and 40-50% of fatal single vehicle crashes to
5fatigue (Staysafe 1989). Staysafe (1989) concluded after examining the evidence on crashes
in NSW that casualties involving heavy vehicles would be reduced by at least 25% if all
trips were driven by drivers who were not fatigued. However the role of fatigue in fatal
crashes may be under-estimated, as the actual effects of symptoms of fatigue such as the
impairment of judgement and the ability to anticipate dangerous situations may not be
identified by investigators in many crashes (McDonald 1984).
12. Truck drivers recognise the danger of fatigue: almost a quarter of drivers surveyed
believed that fatigue was an 'extremely important' contributor to truck crashes, and a further
50% believed it was 'important' or 'very important'. However fatigue appears to be accepted
by drivers as an inherent characteristic of the industry and of their lifestyle with which they
must learn to cope.
13. Long distance truck drivers suffer fatigue for many reasons related to their work
environment and the structure of the industry. These reasons, including long hours of
driving, off-road work commitments, long total work hours, alternating day and night shift
work, night driving, pill use and lack of opportunity for regular sleep patterns, are discussed
in the following sections.
WORK PATTERNS
Driving hours
14. On average, drivers spent 67 hours a week driving, two thirds of total working hours.
Large company drivers spent a higher proportion of their work time driving (71%) than
owner drivers (mean of 61%) because large companies have staff to perform many of the
associated tasks of loading, fueling, maintenance and load organisation.
15. Longer working hours, however, do not lead to a higher percentage of driving time
but rather to a higher absolute amount of driving time. This is an important finding because
it suggests that in order to improve one's chances of having more driving hours one has to
invest in a more than proportionally higher amount of non-driving time. This is the
phenomenon of diseconomies of work time which produces the lifestyle common in the
industry.
16. Truck drivers who have regular contracts for all trips tend, other things being equal,
to have a higher percentage of work time behind the wheel. This intuitively plausible finding
highlights the important role that regular contracts have in minimising the amount of
unproductive or marginally productive non-driving time. For instance, drivers with
contracts for none of their loads had a working week, on average, over 14 hours longer
than drivers with contracts for all their loads. However drivers with no contracts spent only
4 hours more driving a week than drivers with contracts for all loads.
Activities prior to trip departure
17. Driving on the road is only part of the total workload for a long distance truck driver:
drivers have a demanding work routine both before and after the actual driving period on a
trip which contributes to fatigue. Drivers’ activities in the 8 hours before beginning their
most recent trip, shown in Table II, highlight the extremely demanding and stressful work
routine of drivers when off the road. However there were strong differences in the pre-trip
6activities by driver type. Large company drivers spent less than a third of their time before
departure on work related activities compared to owner drivers who spent nearly half the 8
hours working. Large company drivers were the only driver type to spend more time
sleeping than working before departure.
Unloading
18. The work load is not over when the driver arrives at the unloading depot. The driver's
demanding work routine continues with cargo unloading which can be time consuming and
also physically tiring. At the end of their most recent trip, a third of drivers reported delays
in being able to unload once the unloading depot was open. A quarter of drivers had to wait
more than an hour before they could unload. Only a third of drivers were not involved in
unloading, with the task done by the freight forwarder or company.
Working hours
19. Total work hours is the most important driver-determined factor in establishing the
opportunity for economic reward. Working hours have a direct influence on the amount of
driving time obtained which in turn contributes to explaining variations in average weekly
earnings net of truck expenses. Drivers spent an average of 105 hours a week earning a
living as a truck driver, including off road activities. This high average arises because some
drivers considered that they worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Hours of work were
higher for independent owner drivers, subcontractors and small company drivers compared
to prime contractors and medium and large company drivers.
TABLE II
ACTIVITIES IN 8 HRS PRIOR TO TRIP DEPARTURE
ACTIVITY % OF DRIVERS AV. TIME ON ACTIVITY
Driving on the road 34% 2 hrs 20 mins
Loading or supervising loading 43% 2 hrs 55 mins
Unloading from previous trip 22% 2 hrs 10 mins
Maintenance 11% 3 hrs 15 mins
Sleeping 48% 5 hrs 20 mins
% OF 8 HRS AV. TIME IN 8 HRS
Total work related activities 42% 3 hrs 20 mins
Total sleeping 32% 2 hrs 35 mins
Total non-work activities 26% 2 hrs 5 mins
20. Drivers who take pills on either some or all trips tend to work longer hours as do
truck drivers who have higher annual truck repayments and those who have rejected loads
in the past year for whatever reason. The aging of a truck driver and the inclusion of
backload provisions in regular contracts also act to reduce work hours. Other influences are
the state in which a driver is based and the incidence of trips between Melbourne and
7Brisbane: West Australian based drivers tend to work longer hours, all other things being
equal.
NIGHT TIME DRIVING
21. Evidence suggests that a higher proportion of crashes occur at night and that fatigue
is greater during night time driving. McDonald (1984) found evidence that crash
involvement is twice as high at night as during the day while Abkowitz (1989) reports that
the hours of the lowest levels of alertness for drivers are between 2am and 7am. Lisper et
al. (1986) found evidence of a differential in reaction time between day and night driving.
Competitive pressures in the industry require overnight driving.
22. We found a high incidence of night time driving. A quarter of all trips sampled were
driven almost totally at night, defined as between 6pm and 6am, while a further 50% of the
trips sampled were driven 40% to 80% at night. On average 60% of the most recent trip
was driven at night.
DRUG USE
23. The study confirmed the widespread belief that long distance truck drivers resort to
taking stimulant drugs to maintain alertness on long trips. Table III shows stimulant use by
driver type. The results support Linklater's (1977) finding of a high incidence of
dependence on stimulant drugs by long distance truck drivers in NSW. Although
AUSTROADS (1991) claims that the use of amphetamines in clinical doses may actually
reduce crash risk, the report also states that amphetamines may impair some driving skills,
such as the judgement of speed, and that long term use can have serious side effects which
could result in an increased risk of crashes.
TABLE III
USE OF STIMULANT DRUGS
Owner Small Medium Large All
STIMULANT USE drivers company company company drivers
Some trips 30.3% 48.5% 36.7% 37.7% 37.3%
Every trip 7.4% 11.5% 11.7% 3.3% 8.8%
24. After allowing for any possible selectivity in respect of pill taking in the population of
long distance truck drivers, the evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a positive and
statistically significant relationship between pill taking and trip speed. On average, drivers
on pills tend to drive at speeds 10 km/h greater than drivers not on pills. The factors
associated with the probability that a driver will take pills are extensive, as Table IV
indicates.
TABLE IV
8INFLUENCES ON PROBABILITY OF DRIVER TAKING PILLS
HIGHER PROBABILITY LOWER PROBABILITY
Driver has always been a truck driver Older driver
More time on the road before trip departure Regular contracts for all trips
Higher gross weight of the truck Owner driver paid per load
Carrying perishable cargo More sleep in 8 hrs before trip departure
More speeding fines in last 12 months
SPEEDING
25. A study of heavy vehicle crashes in NSW between 1982 and 1988 found that 28% of
crashes were associated with excess speed by a heavy vehicle (Sweatman et al. 1990). The
average speed of each driver's last trip was calculated by dividing the length of the trip (in
km) by the driving time for the trip. The mean speed for the whole sample was 81 km/h.
The average speed for each driver type is shown in Table V.
Speeds by route
26. Average trip speed was lower on shorter trips than longer trips, probably because
shorter journeys have a higher proportion of time spent in urban areas with lower speed
limits. Almost half the drivers travelling less than 700 km had an average speed below 70
km/h, compared to only 2% of drivers travelling over 2000 km while only 1.4% of drivers
travelling less than 700 km had an average trip speed of 100 km/h or more, compared to
9% of drivers travelling over 2000 km. Correspondingly, intrastate trips had lower average
speeds than interstate trips. However, average speeds for trips between Sydney and
Victoria were higher than those for the similar distance Sydney and Queensland route.
TABLE V
AVERAGE TRIP SPEED (KM/H) BY DRIVER TYPE
TYPE OF DRIVER MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX
Owner drivers 81.01 12.47 21.67 115.03
Fleet owners 85.91 8.89 67.77 106.51
Prime contractors 77.69 13.99 33.73 96.84
Ind. subcontractors 82.01 13.00 33.70 115.03
Ind. owner drivers 79.81 12.14 21.67 104.00
Employee drivers 81.08 12.68 27.28 118.19
Small company drivers 82.01 12.03 42.40 118.19
Medium company drivers 80.92 13.21 27.28 116.97
Large company drivers 79.81 12.90 34.63 114.00
9Mean - All drivers 81.06 12.60 21.67 118.19
27. Younger drivers with little experience were on average travelling the fastest and the
older drivers with the most experience were travelling at slower speeds. Unfortunately there
is a tendency for younger drivers to be involved in a greater percentage of crashes. In the
US, truck drivers under 21 years have a crash rate 5 times the average, falling to twice the
average at 21 years (Seiff 1990).
Speeding fines
28. Speeding fines are an indicator of possibly unsafe behaviour, that is driving faster than
the legal 'safe' speed limit. Over half the drivers interviewed had received at least one
speeding fine in the 12 months preceding the survey. Of those drivers who had received
fines, three-quarters received 1 to 3 fines. One in 5 small company drivers had received 4 or
more speeding fines in the previous 12 months, twice the proportion of owner drivers. Fleet
owners and prime contractors had the lowest number of fines. While approximately half of
all speeding fines were for driving 10 to 20% over the speed limit, a significant proportion
of fines (13%) were for travelling at 30% or more over the speed limit.
SCHEDULES
29. The presence of schedules is an important determinant of on-road performance,
particularly speeding. Although only 37% of the drivers indicated they had a scheduled
arrival time for the specific trip, approximately 60% of all drivers had a self imposed
scheduled time of arrival. Of these drivers, 30% gave unloading first as a reason, and over a
quarter mentioned the need to queue for the next load. The self imposition of schedules is
most likely to be a symptom of the underlying economic pressures in the industry.
30. The model system showed that five variables had a statistically significant influence on
the probability of a driver imposing a schedule. Self imposition is more likely for younger
(and because of its correlation) less experienced drivers. It is reinforced by (or may arise
from) the imposition of a schedule from an employer or freight forwarder. Independent
owner drivers have a significantly higher propensity to self impose schedules than do
employee drivers, prime contractors and subcontractors. The analysis also suggests that
drivers who tend to have a greater number of trip stops involving sleep and rest (after
proxying for trip length) tend to have a lower probability of self imposing schedules. This
arises most plausibly because of the reduced pressure on the driver's earning opportunity.
LOG BOOK, TRUCK FAULT AND OVERLOADING FINES
31. Other unsafe behaviour is indicated by the number of fines received for overloading,
log book breaches, truck faults and other infringements. Table VI indicates the
frequency/incidence and cost of fines. However, it does not appear that the cost of fines is
sufficiently high to discourage unsafe behaviour such as speeding, overloading, driving
regulation breaches and below standard truck maintenance. Staysafe (1989) noted that
monetary penalties aimed at changing behaviour need to be comparable with the economic
motivations to misbehave, that is, operate outside the legal limits.
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TABLE VI
INCIDENCE AND COST OF FINES
TYPE OF FINE % OF DRIVERS WITH AV. TOTAL
AT LEAST ONE FINE COST PER DRIVER
Speeding fines 55% $570
Log book fines 41% $380
Overloading fines 37% $1420
Truck fault fines 11% $280
All types of fines 75% $1150
32. As might be expected the incidence of speeding and log book fines is conditioned by
the number of driving hours which are in absolute terms positively correlated with working
hours. The incidence of speeding fines is statistically significant on the Sydney-Melbourne
route which is attributable to both the quality of the Hume Highway and the apparently
greater police surveillance. Three other factors which appear to be correlated with a greater
number of annual fines are pill use, experience with bad payments which has resulted in
subsequent rejection of loads, and the number of days off work due to sickness.
CRASHES
33. The unsafe behaviour outlined above contributes to (and may result in) crashes. In the
sample, 17% of drivers had been in a crash to which the police had been called in the 2
years preceding the survey (with little variation by driver type). Thirteen percent of the
most recent crashes had resulted in a fatality.
34. Driver training can reduce the number of crashes. The NSW Heavy Vehicle Crash
Study found that at least 25% of the crashes it studied could have been avoided, or their
severity reduced, if drivers had displayed a higher level of skill (Sweatman et al. 1990).
Driver training is not a requirement of entry to the industry, with less than 30% of all
drivers (but 45% of large company drivers) having completed a specialised heavy vehicle
driver training course. Over 80% of drivers agreed that drivers should have to complete a
formal driver training course before being allowed to drive heavy vehicles.
ECONOMIC REWARD
FREIGHT RATES
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35. Freight rates are an important determinant of economic reward. Analysis of freight
rates is based on approximately 60% of the sample, as most company drivers did not know
the rate for their most recent trip. As each trip's rate or fee was negotiated in a number of
dimensions (per load, per tonne, per km), all trip rates were converted to an equivalent rate
per kilometre travelled, based on the length of the trip. The mean rate was $1.23 per km.
Variation in freight rates by route
36. Rates varied greatly by route. Loads considered to be forward loads were paid at the
above average rate of $1.27/km which was approximately a third more than the rate for
backloads ($0.94/km). NSW intrastate trips had the highest average rate at $1.97/km. Of
interstate routes, trips originating from Melbourne and the rest of Victoria had the highest
rates ($1.34/km each). Trips from Brisbane and the rest of Queensland to Sydney received
lower than average rates ($0.96/km and $1.00/km respectively). Rates for trips from the
smaller capital cities (Adelaide and Perth) to Sydney were considerably lower than rates for
other routes ($0.76/km and $0.64/km respectively).
Rejection of load due to low rates
37. Approximately half the independent owner drivers (52%) and independent sub-
contractors (47%) had rejected a load due to low rates in the last 12 months, compared to
only 6% of the large company drivers and 20% of medium company drivers. On average
the offered low rate was 25% below the rate the driver would accept for the trip.
TRUCK EXPENSES
38. A substantial investment is required by owner drivers to purchase a truck: the average
purchase price was almost $110,000. Three-quarters of owner drivers borrowed money to
purchase the truck while 16% leased the truck. Short term loans and low deposits result in a
steep repayment structure. Almost all loans were for 5 years or less, while over a quarter of
the drivers who borrowed money to purchase their truck had less than $5,000 deposit. Eight
in 10 drivers who had borrowed money or leased their truck were paying it off at the time
of interview. The average annual repayments in the financial year 1988-89 for drivers paying
off a truck were over $30,000.
39. The model system showed that the financial burden of continuing loan commitments
has the expected negative impact on earnings. Owner drivers with a greater number of years
of outstanding loan repayments tend to have lower earnings. This might be expected
because of the correlation between the number of years of a loan (even allowing for the fact
that loans were taken out at different periods prior to the survey period) and the actual
repayments, which suggests that, all other thing being equal, drivers with longer repayment
periods increasingly are unable to keep net earnings up to a level equivalent to those with
shorter or no repayment periods.
40. Average total running expenses for all owner drivers in the sample were over
$140,000 a year. Major items of expenditure for owner drivers in the 1988-89 financial year
included fuel (average of $61,000 a year), truck repayments ($30,100), maintenance
($17,000) and tyres ($10,400).
INCOME
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41. The average income across the sample from truck driving in the financial year 1988-
89 (after truck-related expenses but before tax) was $32,500. Table VII reveals the
disparity in economic reward received by owner drivers and employee drivers. Over 60% of
owner drivers earned less than $32,000 in the financial year 1988-89, with 36% earning less
than $15,000. In contrast the majority of employee drivers were in the middle income range
of $22,000 - $50,000, with two thirds of large company drivers earning between $32,000
and $50,000, and none below $22,000. For the majority of drivers, the income earned from
truck driving was the only income for their household.
42. Annual income also varied by type of owner driver. A high proportion of independent
owner drivers (36%) and independent subcontractors (41%) were concentrated in the lower
income levels, earning less than $15,000. However the income profile of prime contractors
more closely resembled employee drivers, with over a quarter of drivers earning over
$50,000 a year. There was a great range in income for fleet owners.
TABLE VII
INCOME RECEIVED FROM TRUCK DRIVING 1989-90
Owner Small Medium Large All
INCOME drivers company company company Drivers
Less than $15,00035.8% 7.0% 4.3% 0.8% 16.4%
$15,000 - $32,000 25.5% 47.5% 49.0% 18.0% 35.1%
$32,000 - $50,000 20.4% 39.0% 38.3% 66.4% 35.8%
More than $50,000 18.4% 6.5% 8.5% 14.7% 12.7%
43. There is a marked variation in the productivity of various work activities in the
trucking industry. Drivers with longer working weeks did not earn substantially higher than
average incomes. Of those drivers working over 140 hours a week, only 6% earned over
$60,000 a year, compared to 5% of all drivers, with more long working drivers earning less
than $9,000 a year compared to all drivers. However drivers who spent over 100 hours a
week driving had a higher average income than the rest of the sample, with 12% earning
over $60,000 a year compared to 5% of the whole sample.
CONTRACTS
44. The availability of loads and the certainty of supply of loads is important in
determining the economic prospects, at least in the short term, for the driver and the
company. A third of drivers had contracts for all their loads, while 22% had no regular
contracts. Table VIII shows the availability of contracts. Drivers with contracts for all their
loads had an average annual income almost $10,000 higher than drivers with contracts for
none of their loads.
45. A regular contract on a forward load is reduced in value if there is no guarantee that
there will be an economically viable load on the return trip. This is particularly so for trips
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to Perth and Brisbane where the flow of freight out of these centres is much less than the
flow of freight to these destinations. Of all drivers, over a third had no arrangements in the
forward load contract or no other contract to cover the backload leg of a forward load
contract.
46. Through the influence of total work hours on the incidence of driving time, there is
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the higher the proportion of work time
behind the wheel, the greater the economic rewards, after allowing for a number of
contextual, background, lifestyle and other influences. The existence of a regular contract is
one of the main sources of influence on weekly earnings. Drivers with no regular contracts
tend to commit themselves to long periods of waiting to secure the next load. All other
things being equal, there is a strong and increasingly negative impact on earnings from
extended periods of waiting time. The most noticeable reduction in earnings occurs when
waiting for the next load exceeds 24 hours. Of those drivers who did not have a contract
arrangement for any of their loads, three-quarters claimed that they usually organised
another load in less than 24 hours.
TABLE VIII
REGULAR CONTRACTS AND BACKLOAD PROVISIONS
REGULAR CONTRACTS BACKLOAD PROVISIONS
No Yes Other contract
All loads 32.0% 21.4% 69.1% 9.5%
Some loads 43.3% 68.2% 23.9% 7.9%
No loads 21.7%
Don't know 3.0%
Total 100.0%
METHOD OF PAYMENT
47. While employee drivers may have the surety of employment, trip-related payments
influence on-road behaviour by providing an incentive to increase income by increasing
work undertaken. Almost 80% of employee drivers were paid in relation to the work load
of their truck: 64% were paid by the trip, 9% were paid a percentage of the truck earnings
while 6% were paid a salary plus trip money. Thus there is economic pressure on the
employee driver to complete a trip as quickly as possible and to undertake as many trips as
possible.
LINKING ON-ROAD PERFORMANCE AND ECONOMIC REWARD
FINDINGS ON SPEEDING
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48. The estimated models, reported in Hensher et al. (1991), contain intuitively plausible
findings about speeding (and hence exposure to risk) which give confidence in the quality of
the data collected for this study. Most of the variables discussed below individually affect
the average speed 5 km/h above or below the average. Thus when the variables are
combined, there are some substantial variations in average speeds attributable to sets of
positive effects as well as sets of negative effects.
Trip routes and speeding
49. There is a tendency for drivers on the Sydney-Brisbane route (primarily the poor
quality Pacific Highway) to have lower average speeds than drivers on other routes while
trips between Sydney and Melbourne (along the better quality Hume Highway) tend to have
higher average speeds. This indicates the sensitivity of truck drivers to the quality of the
roads. Trips along the Hume Highway also tend to have a higher incidence of speeding
fines.
Night time driving and speeding
50. A particularly important finding is that trips with a higher percentage of night-time
driving are associated with higher average speeds. However this is not necessarily an
argument to support more travel by heavy vehicles in daylight hours as there may be
considerable adverse implications of having more trucks on the road when more passenger
vehicles are on the road.
Performance and trip length
51. Throughout the study there is a consistent positive correlation between on-road
performance and trip length. The option of mandated longer stops (say up to 12 hours) for
trips over 500 km is worthy of consideration from an immediate safety perspective. It may
have undesirable financial implications because of the likely requirement for a second driver.
The TNT Sydney-Albury-Melbourne express freight run is a good example of safe practice.
Sleeping and speeding
52. Drivers with more 'no-sleep stops' en route tend to have higher average speeds. This
is also linked to the higher propensity to take pills and the imposition by freight forwarders
of schedules on 37% of trips.
Age and speeding
53. There is a strong relationship between age of driver and average speed, as expected:
older drivers tend to travel at lower speeds than younger drivers.
Rates and speeding
54. The role of freight rates (or earnings for owner drivers) on trip speed has been
incorporated in the trip-specific models for those trips for which rates were known. There is
very strong evidence to support the primary hypothesis that the trip rate received by the
owner driver (i.e. gross earnings) and the freight rate obtained by the company using an
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employee driver have a significant influence on the propensity to speed. The negative
relationship is stronger for owner drivers as might be expected.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Economic reward and behaviour
55. Economic rewards to both owner drivers and employers of drivers have a significant
influence on on-road behaviour. In particular, it is the freight rate per se which acts to
stimulate road practices in various forms in order to ensure that an acceptable level of total
earnings (net of truck-related expenses) is obtained. Any deviation from a fixed salary tends
to encourage practices designed to increase economic reward which are not synergetic with
reducing exposure to risk. The uncertainty of annual earnings encourages the practice of
self imposed schedules and the taking of stimulants to enable extension of the productive
working week.
Refuting of anecdotal evidence
56. The anecdotal evidence which tends to lay the blame for unsafe on-road behaviour on
owner drivers is fallacious. Small company employee drivers have some of the worst
industry practices in respect of speeding, use of stimulants and incidence of fines. Indeed
many of the influences on variations in on-road performance, pill taking and self imposition
of schedules which often lead to speeding are not correlated with whether a driver is an
owner driver or an employee driver. The distinction between owner driver and employee
driver is somewhat arbitrary and misleading in the current context. A much more useful
classification is in terms of the nature of contracts.
Lifestyle effects
57. The 'lifestyle' phenomenon appears to have evolved as a result of the ease of entry to
the industry coupled with its highly competitive nature which demands non-routine and
unpredictable work practices for a significant number of drivers in the industry to secure
loads in order to earn a reasonable wage. The lifestyle element of trucking, especially for
owner drivers and small company employees, has reinforced the acceptability of working
practices which in other industries would be regarded as totally unacceptable.
Use of stimulants
58. Competitive pressures in the industry encourage the taking of stimulant drugs by
drivers to push themselves to stay awake for periods long enough to improve their financial
situation. The use of stimulants is as widespread in the employee driver sector as it is in the
owner driver sector, and is regarded by many drivers as an acceptable practice.
IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS
59. Evidence from the study can be used to establish some guidelines for changes in the
industry to improve the working environment to enhance both the economic rewards of
drivers and their on-road performance. Strategies such as the use of regular contracts and
changes in competitive practices in the industry could reduce pressure in the market.
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Regular contracts
60. Changes are required in the competitive practices in the industry: there is a case for
some restrictions on competitive practices in the market, while competition for the market
should be given serious consideration. The rationale for intervention is related to the issue
of externalities of unsafe behaviour: the transactions costs are sufficiently high to warrant
intervention as the safety of human resources at large are at risk.
61. The model system suggests that a preferred form of load allocation is regular
contracts. An improvement in earnings may be achieved in an environment of regular
contracts, with the benefits of the significant reduction in unproductive working hours and
the concomitant flow through to improved performance on the road. By reducing the
amount of work time committed to achieving an acceptable earnings stream, there is a flow
through to a lesser dependence on pills and loss of business. The extent to which the
widespread introduction of regular contracts would result in an increase in earnings for all
operators depends on the extent of bidding for contracts which could result in a reduction
in rates.
62. The contracts could initially be obtained by a process of competitive bidding, with
possibly relatively short contracts in order to ensure that bid prices remain competitive.
Competitive bidding in other transport industries has become a preferred alternative to
complete economic deregulation largely due to the inability of deregulation to internalise
the negative externalities of unfettered competition.
Externalities and rate increases
63. It is desirable to reduce pressures in the market, even after allowing for the possibility
that strategies will result in somewhat higher rates for moving goods. Current low rates for
freight have not internalised the negative externalities which are evident in this industry.
The cost of increased exposure to risk and decreased safety has not been fully borne by the
industry. Changing existing on-road behaviour will reduce exposure to risk and lead to
increases in safety, productivity and efficiency.
Health of the driver
64. Safety regulations should concentrate on the health of the driver, not only the health
of the rig, as they have in the past. Changes to the industry such as those mentioned above
which will lead to a reduction in the pressures in the industry will reduce lifestyle effects
and improve the health of drivers. Reducing the uncertainty of earnings will reduce the total
work hours, increase sleep time and reduce the incidence of self imposed schedules and use
of stimulants.
Financial burden
65. As truck repayments are a major financial commitment for owner drivers, the net
earnings of the owner driver sector could be improved by minimising the burden of truck
financing by tighter controls on the availability of finance to drivers and/or more favourable
loan arrangements.
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CONCLUSION
66. This empirical inquiry has established links between good and bad practice, positive
and negative incentives and the two key concerns of economic reward and on-road
performance in the context of exposure to risk. A strong relationship between economic
reward and on-road performance was demonstrated through an econometric modelling
approach. Elements of on-road behaviour include fatigue arising from working and driving
hours, work routines, night time driving and stimulant use, and imposition of schedules and
speeding. The study's main finding is that economic reward (through freight rates) has a
major influence on on-road behaviour; that any deviation from a fixed salary encourages
behaviour to increase economic reward and increases exposure to risk; that the uncertainty
of annual earnings encourages unsafe practices; and that regular competitive contracts are a
preferred form of load allocation.
67. The finding that on-road behaviour is influenced by economic reward and the
structure of the industry has important implications for the road transport freight industry.
Underlying the reputation of the industry in Australia as efficient and productive is an
element of unsafe driver behaviour which is influenced significantly by the conditions and
structure of economic reward in the industry. The freight task should be performed
efficiently without unsafe practices being an accepted part of the industry.
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